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I. INTRODUCTION
In our legal system of trial by jury, a good deal of the law of evidence is
given to exploring hearsay and its exceptions. "The factors upon which the
value of testimony depends, are: the perception, memory, narration, and
sincerity of the witness."1 In order to encourage witnesses to put forth their
* Leonard Birdsong is an Associate Professor of Law at Barry University School of
Law, Orlando, Florida. He received his B.A. (Cum Laude) at Howard University in 1968 and
his J.D. from Harvard Law School in 1973. He served as an Assistant U.S. Attorney for the
District of Columbia, and later as a Special Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Virgin Islands. He
teaches Evidence, Criminal Law, and White Collar Crime. He also appears as a legal analyst
for Fox News, Court TV, and MSNBC. Professor Birdsong wishes to thank reference
librarians Warren McEwen, Alan Diefenbach, and Michael Schnau of the Barry University
School of Law Library for their research assistance in preparation of this article. He also
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best efforts and to expose inaccuracies that might be present with respect to
any of these factors, our trial system has developed what is known as the
testimonial ideal. That is, witnesses are required to testify under oath, testify
in person, and be subject to cross examination. The rule against hearsay is
designed to insure compliance with these ideals. When one of them is
absent, a hearsay objection becomes pertinent.2 Hearsay evidence is often
characterized as unreliable and untrustworthy. Nevertheless, courts con-
stantly admit hearsay evidence under the numerous exceptions found in the
common law and in latter day statutes. "Hearsay evidence exhibits a wide
range of reliability. The effort to adjust the rules of admissibility [of hearsay
evidence] to variations in reliability has been a major motivating factor in
the movement to liberalize evidence law."
3
The Federal Rules of Evidence, adopted in 19754 for use in the federal
courts and adopted by many states, have helped liberalize the introduction of
trustworthy hearsay evidence at trials. The Federal Rules of Evidence
recognize twenty-eight standard exceptions to the hearsay rule.6 In addition
7to those exceptions and the "nonhearsay" exceptions, Congress, in pro-
mulgating the Federal Rules of Evidence?, adopted rules 803(24) and
804(b)(5), as residual hearsay exceptions. Such rules allowed the introduc-
tion of hearsay statements not specifically covered by any of the named
exceptions but having circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness if the
court determined that certain stated conditions were met.
8
wishes to thank Professor Stephen Leacock of Barry University School of Law for reading and
offering helpful insights to the preparation of this article.
1. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 245 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See GLEN WEISSENBERGER, FEDERAL RuLEs OF EVIDENCE: 1996 COURTROOM
MANUAL (1995).
5. Rule 102 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that "these rules shall be
construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay,
and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may
be ascertained and proceedings justly determined."
6. FED. R. EviD. 803(1)-(23), 804(b)(1)-(4), (6).
7. FED. R. EvED. 801(d).
8. FED. R. Evm. 803 (1997) provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as
witness:
(24) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing
exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the
court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence
[Vol. 26:59
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It was intended that the residual exceptions would be used sparingly by
the courts and only in rare and exceptional circumstances. 9 The Advisory
Committee cautioned that the residual exceptions "do not contemplate an
unfettered exercise of judicial discretion, but they do provide for treating
new and presently unanticipated situations which demonstrate trustworthy-
ness within the spirit of the specifically stated exceptions."
1 °
"Of all the exceptions [to the hearsay rule], the residual exceptions have
probably generated the greatest amount of controversy."' 1  One evidence
scholar, James Beaver, who has examined the use of the residual exceptions,
fears that the residual exceptions will swallow the hearsay rule. 12 Another
scholar, Thomas Black, believes that the residual exceptions may be used in
such a manner in the federal courts as to abuse traditional concepts of
evidence. 13  As this article will demonstrate, such fears are totally
unfounded.
In 1997, the residual exceptions of rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5), were
amended and cast into one new rule, 807 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.14
The amended rule provides:
which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general
purpose of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by the admission
of statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this
exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in
advance of trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to
prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it,
including name and address of the declarant.
FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(5) (1997). Rule 804(b)(5) of the 1997 Federal Rules of Evidence is
identical in language except for its preamble which states "the following are not excluded by
the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness."
9. See Senate Comm. on Judiciary, S. Rep. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1974),
reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 7051, 7065-66.
10. See James W. Moore et al., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACrICE, FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE § 803.12 (1997 ed.).
11. James E. Beaver, The Residual Hearsay Exception Reconsidered, 20 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 787, 789 (1993).
12. Id. at 790; but cf. G. Michael Fenner, The Residual Exception to the Hearsay
Rule: The Complete Treatment, 33 CREIGHTON L. REv. 265, 303 (2000) ("the residual
exception is the safety valve of the hearsay rule.").
13. Thomas Black, Federal Rules of Evidence 803(24) & 804(b)(5)-The Residual
Exceptions-An Overview, 25 Hous. L. REv. 13, 56 (1988).
14. Rule 807, of the Federal Rules of Evidence, became effective on December 1,
1997. See FEDERAL RULES OF EVMENCE HANDBOOK (Anderson Publ'g 1999).
3
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A statement not specifically covered by rule 803 or 804 but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is not
excluded by the hearsay rule, if the court determines that (A) the
statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than
any other evidence which the proponent can procure through
reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and
the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the
statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be
admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes
known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or
hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to
prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the statement
and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the
declarant.15
In amending the residual exception the Advisory Committee noted that
"[t]he contents of Rule 803(24) and Rule 804(b)(5) have been combined and
transferred to a new Rule 807. This was done to facilitate additions to Rules
803 and 804. No change in meaning is intended.'
16
Prior to the 1997 amendment, the aforementioned scholar, James
Beaver, surveyed the use of the residual exceptions and found that between
1975 and 1993, the residual exceptions and their state equivalents were
reported in more than 140 federal cases and in more than 90 state cases. 17 He
concludes that such figures suggest that the residual exceptions were being
used more than just in rare and exceptional circumstances. 18 He also
maintained that the residual exceptions weaken the hearsay rule and
cautioned states to refuse to adopt the residuals on the ground that they were
undesirable and unnecessary. 19 Another scholar, John Strong, the general
editor of McCormick on Evidence, believes resort to the exception has been
substantial and is surprised by its prominent use by prosecutors in federal
courts.
2 °
A review of recent cases reveals that the admission of residual hearsay
pursuant to the exception is being used sparingly and only after a good deal
of analysis by both the federal courts and by the courts of states which allow
15. FED. R. EviD. 807.
16. Id.
17. Beaver, supra note 11, at 790.
18. Id. at 791.
19. Id.
20. See MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 324.
[Vol. 26:59
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the exception. In Beaver's survey, he found that the residual exception was
reported in 140 federal cases and 90 state cases. He believes that this was
abuse of the rule and that we better be careful. However, such analysis,
relying solely on the number of reported cases, is flawed. Everything is
relative. The use of the residual exception as reported in 140 cases over a 23
year period does not seem astounding, given there are 13 federal circuit
courts of appeals in the country. Nor does it seem astounding that the
residual exception was reported in 90 state cases during the same period.
We have 50 state court systems, many with a two tier appellate court system
consisting of a court of appeal and a higher state supreme court.
If Beaver had analyzed exactly how the residual exception was used in
each case, he would have found no abuse. The purpose of this article is to
survey and analyze the pertinent reported federal and state decisions
addressing admission of residual hearsay since the 1997 amendment to the
residual exception. Such survey and analysis reveal that there is little
likelihood that the hearsay rule will be swallowed by the residual exception.
A secondary purpose of this article is to provide civil trial lawyers, defense
attorneys, prosecutors, and judges examples of how the circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness of the residual exception have been argued and
analyzed in federal and state courts in recent years.
11. HEARSAY, THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, AND THE STATES
In order to understand the residual exception, one must appreciate the
definition of hearsay under the Federal Rules. The rules first define a
statement as, "an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a
person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion." 22 Thus, hearsay,
under the rules, is "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted."2 The definition is an affirmative one, which says that "an
out-of-court assertion offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted is
hearsay." 2  "Exceptions to the hearsay rule usually are justified on the
ground that evidence meeting the requirements of the exception possess
special reliability and often special need, such as the unavailability of the
21. In May, 2001 the author, with assistance from the Barry University School of Law
Library reference staff, undertook an on-line search of cited cases referencing the residual
exception since 1997. The cases cited herein are a result of that search.
22. FED. R. Evm. 801(a).
23. FED. R. Evin. 801(c).
24. See MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 246.
2001]
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declarant."5 That is, there is an objective guaranty of trustworthiness to
such statements.26
The often cited examples of exceptions that exhibit such guarantees of
trustworthiness are the excited utterance,27 statements for purposes of
medical diagnosis,2 records of regularly conducted activity,29 statements in
ancient documents, the dying declaration, and, of course, statements
against interest.
32
Forty-one states, Puerto Rico, and the military have adopted the Federal
Rules of Evidence.33 The majority of these states adopted rules of evidence
based on the final Federal Rules of Evidence.34 As the Federal Rules of
Evidence are amended, some states also promptly amend their corresponding
rules to maintain similarity with the federal rules.35  "The following states
have not adopted rules of evidence based on the Federal Rules of Evidence:
25. Id. § 254.
26. Id. § 256.
27. FED. R. EvID. 803(2).
28. FED. R. Evin. 803(4).
29. FED. R. Evm. 803(6).
30. FED. R. EvID. 803(16).
31. FED. R. EviD. 804(b)(2).
32. FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(3).
33. 6 WEINSTEN'S FEDERAL EViDENCE, TI (2d ed. 2000)
34. Id. at T2-T7. The Alabama Rules of Evidence became effective 1/1/96; Alaska
Rules effective 8/1/79; Arizona Rules effective 9/1/77; Arkansas Rules effective 7/1/76;
Colorado Rules effective 1/1/80; Delaware Rules effective 1/1/80; Florida Rules effective
7/1/79; Hawaii Rules effective 1/1/81; Idaho Rules effective 1/1/85; Indiana Rules effective
1/1/94; Iowa Rules effective 1/1/83; Kentucky Rules effective 1/1/92; Louisiana Rules
effective 1/1/89; Maine Rules effective 2/2/76; Maryland Rules effective 1/1/94; Michigan
Rules effective 3/1/78; Minnesota Rules effective 7/1/77; Mississippi Rules effective I/1/86;
Montana Rules effective 7/1/77; Nebraska Rules effective 8/24/75; Nevada Rules effective
1/1/71 (based on Preliminary Draft of the Federal Rules); New Hampshire Rules effective
1/1/85; New Jersey Rules effective 1/1/93; New Mexico Rules effective 1/1/73 (amended
7/1/76 to conform to the changes made to the draft Federal Rules by Congress); North
Carolina Rules effective 7/1/84; North Dakota Rules effective 2/15/77; Ohio Rules effective
7/1/80; Oklahoma Rules effective 10/1/78; Oregon Rules effective 1/1/82; Pennsylvania Rules
effective 10/1/98; Puerto Rico Rules effective 10/1/79; Rhode Island Rules effective 10/1/87;
South Carolina Rules effective 9/3/95; South Dakota Rules effective 7/1/78; Tennessee Rules
effective 1/1/90; Texas Rules effective 3/1/98; Utah Rules effective 9/1/83; Vermont Rules
effective 4/1/83; Washington Rules effective 4/2/79; West Virginia Rules effective 2/1/85;
Wisconsin Rules effective 7/1/74 (based on Final Draft of the Federal Rules); Wyoming Rules
effective 1/1/78. The Military Rules of Evidence are based on the Federal Rules and were
adopted 3/12/80. Id. at T2-T7 (citations omitted).
35. Id. atTl.
[Vol. 26:59
6
Nova Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 4
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol26/iss1/4
Birdsong
California, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas,
Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, Virginia, and the Virgin Islands. ' 36
The forty-one states, Puerto Rico; and the military that have adopted the
Federal Rules of Evidence have all adopted rules similar to the hearsay rule
of 801.3 7  However, not all of these states have adopted the residual
exceptions.38 Of the states that have adopted such residual exceptions,
Colorado appears to be the only state to have already amended its rules to
combine the 803(24) and 804(b)(5) into one rule 807 as have the Federal
Rules of Evidence.3 9 The states which have not adopted a residual exception
are: Alabama, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, New Jersey, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, and
Washington. Louisiana limits its residual exception to civil cases.
1
Nevada and Wisconsin omit the notice requirement of the federal rule.
43
Although Florida has not adopted a residual exception akin to rule 807,
it has two sections of its evidence code4 which speak to the kinds of
circumstances where residual hearsay exceptions often are applied. These
may be thought of as "quasi residual" exceptions. Section 90.803(23) of the
Florida Evidence Code, allows the use of out-of-court statements of a child,
eleven years old or less, describing child abuse, neglect, or sexual abuse
against the child,45 after the court holds a hearing to determine reliability of
such statements.4 The statute is applicable whether the child is available or
unavailable to testify.47 If the child is unavailable to testify and the
statements are deemed to be reliable by the court, there must be other
36. Id at T7.
37. Id. at T106-12.
38. WEINSTEIN, supra note 33, at T159-61. The states that have adopted residual
exceptions are: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa,
Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Puerto Rico,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming, and the United
States Military.
39. Id. at T159-61; see also CoLo. R. EvID. 807, effective January 1, 1999.
40. Id. at T159-61.
41. Id. at T160.
42. The State of Nevada has no residual exception where the declarant is available.
Nevada does provide a residual exception akin to rule 807 when the declarant is unavailable.
However, the Nevada rule omits the notice requirement. Id. at T160.
43. WEINSTEIN, supra note 33, at T160, T162.
44. See FLA. R. EvD. § 90.803(23), (24) (2000).
45. FLA. R. EVID. § 90.803(23)(a) (2000).
46. § 90.803(23)(a)(1).
47. § 90.803(23)(a)(2)(a), (b).
2001]
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corroborating evidence of the offense before such statement may be used.4
There is also a ten day notice requirement that must be given to a defendant
in a criminal case.49 Finally, the court, under this statute must make specific
findings of fact on the record as to the basis for its ruling to admit or exclude
the statements.50 Section 90.803(24) of the Florida Evidence Code is identi-
cal, except that it applies to elderly or disabled adults.5 '
Florida promulgated such hearsay exceptions for children in 1985.52
The Florida exception was expanded to the elderly in 1995.53 However, it
was not until after 1990 that a number of other states were confronted with
the need for such exceptions. This was as a result of the Supreme Court's
ruling in State v. Wright.54 In Wright, a child sexual abuse case, the Court
was required to decide whether the admission at trial of certain hearsay state-
ments admitted under Idaho's residual exception violated the defendant's
rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.5 5 The hear-
say statements were made by a child declarant to an examining pediatri-
cian.5 6 At trial, the child was unavailable as a witness 57 and the pediatrician
58
testified as to the child's statements concerning the abuse.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Supreme Court of Idaho, which ruled
that the defendant's right to confrontation had been denied by admission of
the testimony.5 9 The Court held that the State of Idaho could not use other
evidence corroborating the truth of such a hearsay statement to support a
findin that the statement bore "particularized guarantees of trustworthy-
ness." In other words, to be admissible under the Confrontation Clause,
hearsay evidence used to convict a defendant must possess indicia of
reliability by virtue of its inherent trustworthiness, not by reference to other
evidence at trial. 61 The Court in Wright declined to endorse a mechanical
48. § 90.803 (23)(a)(2)(b).
49. § 90.803(23)(b).
50. § 90.803(23)(c).
51. § 90.803(24)(a)-(c).
52. See In re Amendments to Florida Evidence Code, 782 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 2000).
53. § 90.803(24).
54. 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
55. Id. at 808.
56. Id. at 809.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Wright, 497 U.S. at 827.
60. Id. at 823.
61. Id.
[Vol. 26:59
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test for determining "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness,"
62
however, the Court alluded to a number of factors that might make the
hearsay statements made by a child in an abuse case reliable, including
spontaneity and consistent repetition, lack of motive to fabricate, mental
state of the declarant, and use of terminology unexpected of a child of
similar age.
3
III. AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR EXAMINING THE RESIDUAL
EXCEPTION
A. Appropriate Indicia of Reliability
All hearsay exceptions must exhibit an element of trustworthiness
which derives from certain appropriate indicia of reliability. One often
cited example of a trustworthy hearsay exception is the dying declaration."
It has long been considered reliable that a man would not go to his death
with a lie on his lips. Obviously, fear of retribution in the afterlife provides
the appropriate indicia of reliability to make the dying declaration
trustworthy. So how do we find the appropriate indicia in the residual
hearsay exception? Rule 807 provides that "a statement not specifically
covered by 803 or 804 but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness, is not excluded by the hearsay rule... ,,65 "In applying the
residual exceptions, the most important issue is whether the statement offers
'equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness' to those found in
other specific hearsay exceptions. 66
The factors supporting trustworthiness are varied, but a few recurring
factors may be pertinent to the determination of admissibility. Among them
would be: 1) whether the declarant had a motivation to speak truthfully; 2)
the spontaneity of the statement; 3) the time lapse between the event and the
statement; 4) whether the declarant was under oath; 5) whether declarant has
been cross-examined; 6) whether the declarant has recanted or reaffirmed the
statement; and 7) whether the declarant's first hand knowledge is clearly
demonstrated. 67  A court may also consider whether an out-of-court
statement was corroborated by the declarant, who was available and testified
62. Id. at 824-25.
63. Id. at 826.
64. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2).
65. FED. R. Evm. 807.
66. McCORMICK, supra note 1, § 324.
67. Id.
2001]
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at trial. 8 Further, a court might look to circumstances surrounding the
69
extrajudicial statement to determine trustworthiness.
In an effort to determine whether circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness exist, a court may look to: 1) matters that occur at trial; 2)
extrinsic corroboration of the statement; 3) surrounding circumstances
70
concerning the statement; or 4) all of these to determine trustworthiness.
Beaver is troubled by this approach. He complains that with respect to the
residual exception "a court need not be consistent in its use of such
standards.",7' "The standard used can very easily be changed to meet the
necessities of current political expediency or judicial whim., 72 "We have a
container into which anything can be poured.'
Such criticism of the standards for allowing statements pursuant to the
residual exception is flaccid. The appropriate position with respect to the
question of standards is that espoused by Fenner who maintains that
"[w]ithout some residual exception, a statutory set of rules of evidence
simply would not work.",74 "The pressure to admit hearsay evidence that
does not fall under the fixed, specific exceptions would inevitably lead to
one of two things: the evidence would not be admitted and injustice would
be done, or one of the other exceptions would be misread to say that it does
cover the evidence in question." 5 We should always remember that the
Federal Rules of Evidence are to be construed to secure fairness in
administration, and to help the development of the law of evidence to the
76
end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.
The standards for determining the circumstantial guarantees of the
trustworthiness of residual statements must vary. In the cases reviewed
herein, decided since the 1997 amendment to rule 807, we find courts that
admitted residual hearsay because there was little likelihood of fabrication or
inaccuracies with respect to the statements admitted.77 We also find a court
68. See Beaver, supra note 11, at 797.
69. Id. at 797-98 (citing Karme v. Commissioner, 673 F.2d 1062 (9th Cir. 1982),
where the court found that bank records bore circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness
because of the distant location of the bank and because there was no evidence to suggest the
bank records were anything other than what they purported to be).
70. See id.
71. Beaver, supra note 11, at 798.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Fenner, supra note 12, at 303.
75. Id.
76. See FED. R. Evin. 102.
77. See Gonzalez v. Digital Equip. Corp., 8 F. Supp. 2d 194 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
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that admitted such out-of-court statements on the ground that they were
business records produced by a defendant against his interest in litigation
78and thus trustworthy. In the criminal area, we find courts that undertook
extensive analysis to determine: whether the residual hearsay statements
were sufficiently detailed so that they would have been difficult to fabricate;
whether there was a lack of evidence of coercion; whether the declarants had
personal knowledge of the events; and, how soon the statements were made
after the event.
79
., Other courts examined whether the statements sought to be admitted
pursuant to the residual exception were made under oath and subject to the
penalty of perjury; whether such statements had been made voluntarily; and
whether they contradicted previous statements by the declarants.80 Finally,
we find a criminal case in which the court examined: whether the declarant
was offered leniency in exchange for his statement; whether the declarant
attempted to shift blame from himself to the accused; whether the declarant
took full responsibility for his role in the offense; whether the declarant was
caught "red-handed" and merely tried to share his blame by implicating
another; and, whether the declarant was given his Miranda rights.
8 1
As Beaver notes, the courts need not be consistent in their use of
82standards. What is most important with respect to any residual exception
analysis is the determination that such evidence, which might meet the
standard of circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is evidence offered
as evidence of a material fact; that the evidence is the most probative
evidence available on the point for which it is offered; that the interests of
justice will be served by admitting the evidence; and that there was notice of
the evidence.83 One must bear this analytical framework in mind as we
survey the recent cases in an effort to determine whether the residual hearsay
rule is being abused.
B. Notice
The notice requirement of rule 807 is very important. What does notice
mean? When and how must notice be given? The residual exception is not
78. See John Paul Mitchell Sys. v. Quality King Distrib. Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 462
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
79. See United States v. Gomez, 191 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 1999).
80. See United States v. Sanchez-Lima, 161 F.3d 545 (9th Cir. 1998).
81. See State v. Hallum, 585 N.W.2d 249 (1998).
82. Beaver, supra note 11, at 798.
83. FED. R. EvID. 807.
20011
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available unless offering counsel gives opposing counsel advance notice of
his or her intention to offer the out of court statement, and the particulars of
the statement, including the name and address of the out of court declarant. 84
Rule 807 does not require pretrial notice of an intention to use rule 807. All
it requires is notice of an intention to offer the particular statement; not
notice of an intention to use any particular hearsay exception. Once counsel
has notified opposing counsel of an intention to offer the statement in
question, then it can be offered under rule 807.85 The notice may be formal
or less formal. Fenner reminds us the pretrial notice may be a document
filed with the court styled "Notice of Intention to Use Rule 807 Evidence,"
or it may be a letter sent to opposing counsel stating an intention to introduce
particular statements, including the names and addresses of the proposed
declarants.
86
The timing of the notice has been problematic. Both Fenner and Beaver
note that prior to the 1997 amendment, some courts interpreted the notice
requirement more in accord with the spirit of the law than with the letter of
the law. This often creates inconsistency in application of the notice require-
ment.8 7 The rule provides that notice must be "sufficiently in advance of the
trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to
prepare to meet [the evidence]."88 Fenner claims that "some courts stress the
'fair opportunity' part of the notice requirement over the 'in advance of the
trial or hearing' part."89 He notes that "[o]ne influential court has said that
in cases where the need to use this exception does not become apparent until
after the trial has begun, midtrial notice given enough in advance of the
actual use of the evidence can satisfy the rule's pretrial notice require-
ment."9
The cases surveyed herein reveal that variations of the flexible
approach to notice requirement predominate. Although this does not appear
consistent with the plain meaning of the rule, we shall see that the interests
of justice require such flexibility. Even less formal notice is better than no
notice. With this analytical framework in mind with respect to appropriate
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Fenner, supra note 12, at 280.
87. See id. See also Beaver, supra note 11, at 802.
88. FED. R. Evm. 807.
89. Fenner, supra note 12, at 281.
90. See Fenner, supra note 12, at 280 (citing United States v. Iaconetti, 406 F. Supp.
554 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), affd, 540 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1976).
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indicia of reliability and notice, let us survey the recent cases relying on the
residual exception to determine whether the rule is being abused.
IV. RULE 807 CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
A. Civil Cases
Since the 1997 amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence, the
residual exception was cited as an issue in seven civil cases in the federal
courts. The cases come from the Second and Eleventh Circuit Courts of
Appeal, federal district courts in the Eastern District of New York, and the
district court for Puerto Rico. It will be clear from a review of these civil
cases that judges are not abusing their authority with respect to admitting
unreliable hearsay pursuant to the residual exception.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals gave short shrift to a plaintiff's
argument that the residual exception of rule 807 should be admissible to
allow hearsay of a dead witness to help substantiate her claim of copyright
infringement.9' In Herzog v. Castle Rock Entertainment92 the plaintiff,
Herzog, brought a copyright action against the writer, director, producer, and
distributor of the motion picture "Lone Star."93 Plaintiff alleged that
defendants infringed her copyright for a screenplay she had written entitled
"Concealed., 94 The district court granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment and Herzog appealed.95 The Eleventh Circuit, relying on the
district court's opinion, upheld the grant of summary judgment on the
grounds that Herzog had failed to establish that Sayles, the writer-director of
"Lone Star," had a reasonable opportunity to view her screenplay, and that
the motion picture and screenplay were not substantially similar.9
Herzog's burden was to show that her screenplay was a copyrighted
work, and that Sayles had copied it.97 9Herzog submitted a certificate of
copyright for her screenplay to the court. The second requirement, proof of
91. Herzog v. Castle Rock Entr't, 193 F.3d 1241 (1 1th Cir. 1999).
92. 193 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 1999).
93. Id. at 1243.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1244.
96. Id. at 1263.
97. Herzog, 193 F.3d at 1249.
98. Id.
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copying, she attempted to prove circumstantially by demonstrating that the
person who copied the work had access to her copyrighted screenplay.99
Herzog averred that she had written the screenplay as a requirement for
her Master Degree in film studies at the University of Miami.1° She had
given her screenplay to Cosford, one of her professors for review.'01 He had
never returned it to her.102 After "Lone Star" was released, she learned that
Sayles was an acquaintance of Cosford and that Sayles and Cosford had met
for lunch in Miami during the time Cosford had her screenplay.1 3 Herzog
theorized that Cosford had shown Sayles her work.1 4 By the time of the
lawsuit, Cosford had died and was, thus, unavailable to testify as to whether
he had shown Sayles the screenplay.
0 5
Herzog sought to introduce, under rule 807, hearsay statements of
Allegro, another Professor at the University of Miami.10 6 Allegro testified at
deposition that Cosford told him that he was reading Herzog's screenplay
and he found it interesting.'0 7 Allegro, further, testified that during this same
time period Sayles was in Miami and Cosford came out of his office at the
university and announced to Allegro that he was on his way home to pick up
Sayles to take him to lunch. 108 Allegro also testified that he only inferred
from Cosford's statements that he was picking up Sayles at his home and
that he had never actually saw Sayles and Cosford together.'
0 9
Courts cannot properly consider hearsay evidence in ruling on motions
for summary judgment. 10 Defendants argued that the proffered testimony of
Allegro would be inadmissible hearsay. There were no equivalent guaran-
tees of trustworthiness found in those conversations.1 12 The Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals agreed on the ground that rule 807 requires the equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness covered by exceptions in rule
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1244.
101. Id.
102. Herzog, 193 F.3d at 1244-45.
103. Id. at 1245.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1252.
106. Id. at 1252-53.
107. Herzog, 193 F.3d at 1252-53.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1254 (citing Martin v. John W. Stone Oil Distrib., Inc., 819 F.2d 547, 549
(5th Cir.1987)).
111. Id. at 1254.
112. Herzog, 193 F.3d at 1255.
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803 and rule 804.113 The court undertook the requisite analysis for
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness and found that the conversations
had taken place five years earlier and Allegro was vague and not precise or
knowledgeable in his memory of the conversations.'
1 4
This was hearsay of the worst kind. The court found that even if such
hearsay was admissible to show that Cosford had a copy of Herzog's
screenplay and that Sayles had stayed at Cosford's home in 1993, said
evidence did not establish that Cosford had a copy of the screenplay with
him when he met Sayles for lunch and that he allowed Sayles to see it, and
that Sayles was not truthful when he averred he had never heard of Herzog's
composition." 5 Also, there was no allegation that Cosford previously
contributed creative ideas or material to Sayles.'
16
The hearsay was not admitted despite proper pretrial notice being given
under the residual exception. No appropriate indicia of reliability could be
found on the facts of the case. The Eleventh Circuit did not abuse its powers
by allowing the admission of unreliable hearsay pursuant to the residual
exception in Herzog.
In Schering Corp. v. Pfizer, Inc.,' 7 the Second Circuit found that
although certain surveys offered by plaintiffs in a false advertising case
called for statements concerning memory, this did not automatically preclude
their admission under the residual exception of rule 807.18 The plaintiff,
Schering, was a pharmaceutical company that produces Claritin, a prescrip-
tion antihistamine.' 9 UCB, a European pharmaceutical company, developed
a competing product called Zyrtec.' ° UCB licensed Pfizer, a Delaware
corporation to promote Zyrtec in the United States.' 2' In 1996, Schering
brought an action against UCB and Pfizer alleging false advertising with
respect to Zyrtec in violation of the Lanham Act and a prior settlement
agreement between the parties.
22
At a 1998 hearing on a preliminary injunction, Schering sought to
introduce five surveys concerning the marketing and sale of Zyrtec to
113. Id. at 1254.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1255.
116. Id.
117. 189 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 1999).
118. Id. at 240.
119. Id. at221.
120. Id.
121. ld. at222.
122. Schering Corp., 189 F.3d at 222.
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123doctors. Pfizer responded to the motion on grounds that the surveys were
inadmissible as hearsay.1 4 The district court agreed and issued a written
opinion disallowing the surveys for any purpose.125 The trial court denied
the injunction and Schering appealed.126 The Second Circuit found that the
surveys should have been allowed, vacated the judgment, and remanded the
case for further hearing regarding the surveys concerning memory
statements.127
Five surveys Schering had sought to introduce called for more
information than rule 803(3) would allow."2 The court found that those
surveys went beyond the state of mind of those surveyed and called for
memory or belief to prove the facts remembered or believed. 29 However,
Pfizer had also sought to introduce the surveys under the residual hearsay
exception. 30 The court examined the surveys and rule 807 and found that
the lower court had abused its discretion by not allowing admission of the
surveys pursuant to the residual exception. 13  The Second Circuit held that
the trial court had been in error to rule against the use of out-of-court
memory statements to prove facts remembered.132 The court reminded us
that:
Unlike Rule 803(3), which explicitly excludes from its purview
memory statements offered to establish the facts remembered, the
residual hearsay rule contains no such express limitation. There is
a reason for this difference. Almost any statement used to describe
events that a speaker has experienced in the past can be
characterized as a 'memory,' which is a presently-existing state of
123. Id. at 223.
124. Id. at 224.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Schering Corp., 189 F.3d at 239-40.
128. Rule 803 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is
available as a witness: (3) A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind,
emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental
feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to
prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation,
identification, or terms of declarant's will.
FED. R. EviD. 803(3).
129. Schering Corp., 189 F.3d at 231.
130. Id. at 224.
131. Id. at 231.
132. Id.
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mind when it is conveyed. If such statements were admissible
under Rule 803(3) to prove the facts remembered, parties could
thus offer hearsay to establish almost any past fact, a result that
would indeed mark the 'the virtual destruction of the hearsay
rule' .... The residual hearsay rule, by contrast, escapes this
problem by setting forth its own set of requirements, which include
necessity and trustworthiness, before it will allow for a statement's
admission.
133
The court held that memory surveys, in principle, may have greater
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness than many other traditional
exceptions to the hearsay rule, but that it was the methodological validity of
the survey that had to be examined before a guaranty of trustworthiness
could be assured.134
In Schering Corp., the court found that there was long standing notice
of the intent to introduce the surveys.135 The court further found that the
surveys were trustworthy and necessary, and concluded that in the context of
survey evidence, the interests of justice and the general purposes of the rules
of evidence are generally best served by the admission of the surveys that
meet these two criteria. 36 A review of the case shows that the residual
exception is not being abused in the Second Circuit, rather, the exception is
being put to a strong analytical process as to its application.
In Rotolo v. Digital Equipment Corp., 37 the Second Circuit overturned
a trial court judgment on the ground that the notice requirement of 807"3 had
not been met." 9  In this case, plaintiff brought a products liability case
against Digital, alleging that she suffered repetitive stress injuries resulting
from the use of their computer keyboard.14° Plaintiff presented evidence of
her injuries and evidence from medical witnesses to bolster her claim. 141
133. l at 232.
134. Schering Corp., 189 F.3d at. 234.
135. Id. at 238.
136. Id.
137. 150 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 1998).
138. The notice requirement of FED. R. EVlID. 807 provides:
However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent
of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to
provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it... including the
name and address of the declarant.
FED. R. EvlD. 807.
139. Id. at 226.
140. Rotolo, 150 F.3d at 224.
141. Id.
2001]
17
Birdsong: Evidence Law
Published by NSUWorks, 2001
Nova Law Review
Plaintiff's attorneys also came into possession of a videotape made by Apple
Computer Corporation. 42  The tape, which was received in evidence,
contained the voice and images of three Apple consultants who asserted and
emphasized the existence of a possible causal connection between computer
keyboard use and repetitive stress injury. 43  Digital objected to the
introduction of the videotape as hearsay.1'"
The Second Circuit agreed that the videotape contained inadmissible
hearsay and vacated judgment and remanded the case. 45 The court found
that the consultants that appeared in the videotape, two identified as
physicians and one as an engineer, were unswom witnesses, whose
qualifications were not expounded upon or subjected to cross-
examination.' Rotolo's counsel had informed the trial court that he was
not offering the videotape because it was publicly available, but offered it
"as appropriate and compelling state of the art proof as to what could be
known. The court held it was error to admit the report.1 Before a
defendant, who has never seen an unpublished report that is not part of the
published literature, can be said to have non-hearsay notice, it must be
shown that the defendant "was at least inferentially put on notice by the
report."' 49 Digital presented proof that it had no such notice of the report or
that they should have seen it as a part of the published literature on the
industry. 50
The court held a rule 807 residual exception inapplicable to the
videotape evidence because the advance notice of intent to use that section
was not used.' 5' The court further found that the district court "nisadvised
the jury that it might consider the videotape as evidence of 'what might have
been made available [to] these defendants [sic] and what was in the field to
show what their state of mind was or should have been.... ' Simply put, the
Apple videotape was inadmissible hearsay.' '152  No notice, no residual
exception. No abuse there.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Rotolo, 150 F.3d at 223.
146. Id. at 223.
147. Id. at 225.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Rotolo, 150 F.3d at 225.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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Rotolo v. Digital Equipment Corp. was decided on July 24, 1998.13 A
month earlier the same company, Digital, had not fared as well in a similar
case heard in the District Court of the Eastern District of New York. On
June 8, 1998, plaintiffs prevailed in the case of Gonzalez v. Digital
Equipment Corp.'54 Much of that case concerned the rule 807 residual
exception. Although notice was also at issue, the court in Gonzalez reached
a result opposite that of the court in Rotolo.
In Gonzalez, a number of plaintiffs had sued Digital claiming that their
upper body, arm, or hand problems had been caused by repeated use of
Digital's computer keyboards and that they had not been properly warned by
Digital of the possibility of such injury.155 Plaintiffs sought to introduce
documents and two videotapes, one produced by IBM and the other
produced by Apple Computer which addressed the comfort disorders of
keyboard users. Digital moved to exclude such evidence, alleging among
other reasons, that it was hearsay. 157 The district court found that the
proffered evidence was relevant to the proceedings on the theory that
evidence of the current state of mind of large producers in this industry was
relevant. 58 It allowed the inference that given the state of the art at that
time, members of the industry as a whole had, or should have had, the same
"state of mind" with respect to possible users that needed to be considered
by each of the manufactures even though they were operating separately.1
59
Since Digital had "a duty to keep abreast of scientific knowledge,
discoveries and advances it [was] presumed to know what [was] imparted
thereby.' 160 Thus, the documents and videos were deemed relevant.'
6
'
The court ruled that with respect to the hearsay objection such
documents would be admitted pursuant to the residual exception. 62 The
court specifically found that the notice requirement of 807 had been met,
because Digital had notice for an extended time (a whole year and one half
prior to trial) that the evidence had been proposed. 63 The court also foundthat the proffered evidence offered evidence of a material fact and the
153. Id. at 223.
154. 8 F. Supp. 2d 194 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
155. l at 196.
156. Id.
157. Id
158. Id at 197.
159. Gonzalez, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 197.
160. Id at 198.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 201.
163. Id.
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internal materials were highly probative. 164 The court further found that the
"general interests of justice and the standards of trustworthiness" had been
met in the case. 165 The court maintained that the fear of fabrication or of
inaccuracies inherent in much hearsay was unfounded because these videos
had been created for legitimate business reasons and were less likely to have
been fabricated than would testimony of a live witness. 66 The court also
found that with respect to inaccuracies, the videos were more likely to be
more accurate than a live witnesses because they were created internally and
with great care.167 The court did not find the inability to cross-examine with
respect of the videotapes compelling, because Digital could call its own
experts or those who created the videotapes to refute contentions of
notice.
1 68
The court allowed admission of the documents and videotapes under the
residual rule to show the state of mind of other producers in the industry on
the issue of notice.i69 Although notice was informal in this case, the court
found that a proposal made by plaintiffs to use the evidence a year and a half
prior to trial met the notice requirement.1 70 This stands in stark contrast to
Rotolo, where there was no advance notice of the intent to use the
evidence.171 Again, in Gonzalez, the district court followed a well-reasoned
analytical framework to determine whether the evidence bore adequate
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness and that there was proper
notice. Such analytical approach to admitting evidence pursuant to the
residual exception should put to rest fears by Beaver and others that the
residual exception will swallow the hearsay rule.
In Vasquez v. National Car Rental Systems, Inc.,7 2 the district court in
Puerto Rico held that a statement by a driver in an auto accident was not
admissible under the rule 807 residual exception. 173 Mr. and Mrs. Lopez had
rented a car from defendant at Puerto Rico's international airport on
December 26, 1997.174 Shortly thereafter, they were in a auto accident with
164. Gonzalez, 8 F. Supp. at 201.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Gonzalez, 8 F. Supp. at 202.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. 24 F. Supp. 2d 197 (D.P.R. 1998).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 198.
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another vehicle driven by Gonzalez.175 Mr. Lopez, the driver of the rented
vehicle, died several days later as a result of his injuries.' 76 Mrs. Lopez, the
passenger, was also injured and subsequently died. 77 Suit was brought
pursuant to a diversity action by Mrs. Lopez's daughters, the Vazquezs.
78
Plaintiffs sued National, because under Puerto Rico Law, the owner of a
leased vehicle is accountable for its lessee's negligence.
1 79
National sought admission into evidence of certain portions of Ms.
Vazquez's deposition testimony in which she described Mr. Lopez's
utterances right after the accident. 80 According to plaintiff, Vasquez, her
mother told her that immediately after the accident Mr. Lopez uttered to her
the words "[w]hat hit us?"'181 National offered this evidence because it cast
doubt as to who hit whom. '1 2 National argued that because Mr. Lopez did
not explicitly say that he ran a red light or was negligent in his driving, there
was uncertainty as to whether he was negligent.18 Under Puerto Rico Law,
114defendant's liability hinged on the driver's liability (i.e. lessee's liability).
If National could prove that Mr. Lopez was not driving negligently, the
defendant would not be liable. National acknowledged that such statement
would be hearsay but sought to have it admitted under the residual hearsay
rule.'8
5
The court reviewed rule 807 and the facts and found that there was
adequate notice of intent to use the statements.186 Yet, the court did not
allow the hearsay evidence on the grounds that the evidence fell below the
threshold of trustworthiness required by the rule. 87 The court found that
even though in the hospital, the circumstances surrounding Mr. Lopez's
remarks did not assure the court that he was under a condition that would
still his capacity of reflection or that he was under any pressure to tell the
truth.188 The court found further that the defendant had "failed to prove that
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Vasquez, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 198.
178. Id.
179. See 9 P.R. LAws ANN. § 1751 (1996).
180. Vasquez, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 199.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See 9 P.R. LAWS ANN. § 1751 (1996).
185. Vasquez, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 199.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 200.
188. Id.
20011
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Mr. Lopez had reliable knowledge of the events that transpired on the night
of the accident."1 89 Ms. Vazquez in her deposition testified that Mr. Lopez
was not clear as to the events that transpired, and that he really did not recall
what happened. 9° The court disallowed the evidence and said it could not
rely on an individual's account of an event, if that individual acknowledged
that he did not recall the specifics of the event,191 as had Mr. Lopez.
1 92
Mr. Lopez's lack of recall would not support a finding of
trustworthiness to his statements. In accord with our analytical framework,
the court found no support to substantiate appropriate indicia of reliability
for his statements. 93 To keep such evidence out was the correct decision.
Here, the hearsay rule prevailed. Critics have little to fear about the use of
the residual exception when a court explains its analysis of the
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness as in Vasquez.194 The hearsay
rule prevails despite the residual exception.
In the case of Chase Manhattan Bank v. Traffic Stream (BVI)
Infrastructure Ltd., 95 the court allowed admission, pursuant to the residual
exception, into evidence, of a news article that had appeared in a Chinese
newspaper.196 In 1998, Chase Bank, acting as a trustee, and Traffic Stream,
had entered into an indenture agreement in which Traffic Stream issued
secured notes to finance a business venture involving the construction of toll
roads in China. 197 In 1999, plaintiff Chase commenced litigation contending
that Traffic Stream had defaulted on payment. 98 Chase sought summary
judgment. 99 Defendant Traffic admitted default but argued that its default
should be excused pursuant to the contract doctrine of impossibility of
performance.2m Traffic Stream contended that a change in Chinese policy
delayed recoupment of money from the toll road projects, making it
impossible for them to fulfill their obligation under the indenture.2
1
189. Id.
190. Vasquez, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 200.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 200.
194. Id.
195. 86 F. Supp. 2d 244 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
196. ld.
197. Id. at 246.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Chase Manhattan Bank, F. Supp. 2d at 247.
201. Id. at 250.
[Vol. 26:59
22
Nova Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 4
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol26/iss1/4
Birdsong
The facts of the case reveal that in the wake of the 1997 Asian financial
crisis, the Chinese government had taken steps to strengthen its supervision
of disbursement of foreign exchange involving Chinese companies doing
business with foreign partners.202 On September 14, 1998, the Chinese State
Administration of Foreign Exchange gave notice of its change in policy.
2 3
The notice was a confidential document of the Chinese government that had
not been publicly released.204 However, news of the notice appeared in the
People's Daily, the official newspaper of the government on September 18,
1998. 205 Traffic Stream maintained that it was this change in foreign
exchange supervision that made it impossible for them to perform.2)6
Chase objected to the introduction of the newspaper article on grounds
that it was hearsay. 207 The court agreed that the article was hearsay but
found the article admissible pursuant to the residual exception of rule 807.208
The court found that Traffic Stream had given Chase adequate notice of its
intention to introduce the article.209 Perhaps, more importantly, the court
found the newspaper article had been offered as evidence of a material fact,
namely a change in Chinese policy, which could have rendered Traffic
Stream's performance under the indenture impossible.2 0 The court also
found that the article was the most probative evidence of the notice of
change of policy that Traffic Stream could reasonably procure, because the
notice itself had not been publicly released by the Chinese government.2
Similarly, the court found because the notice itself was unavailable, "the
interests of justice would best be served by the admission of the article. 21 2
The court further found, with respect to rule 807, the People's Daily
newspaper article had a sufficient guarantee of trustworthiness since it was
published by the Chinese Communist Party Central Commission.1 3
Therefore, it was deemed to be authoritative and representative of the
214
official opinion of the Chinese government.
202. Id. at 251.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Chase Manhattan Bank, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 251.
206. Id.
207. Id at 253.
208. Id. at 254.
209. Id.
210. Chase Manhattan Bank, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 254.
211. Id. at 251.
212. Id
213. Id.
214. Id.
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Although the article was admitted as evidence, Chase was ultimately
granted summary judgment on the claim.215 Nevertheless, the court gave a
well reasoned analysis as to why the evidence should be found admissible
pursuant to the residual exception. 1 6 There had been adequate notice of the
intent to use the newspaper article, and there was a thorough analysis of the
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness that surrounded the introduction
of the article.217 There was no abuse to the traditional hearsay rule in this
case.
In John Paul Mitchell Systems v. Quality King Distributors, Inc.,218 the
residual exception was used to allow the introduction of certain business
records at a hearing on an injunction.21 9 In this case, John Paul Mitchell
sought a preliminary injunction restraining the distributor Quality King from
selling over a million dollars of Paul Mitchell hair care products.2M
Allegedly these products had traveled to China for distribution, but were
diverted to Holland and then back to Quality King's Long Island, New York
221warehouse. Paul Mitchell sought an injunction against Quality King in
order to prevent irreparable damage to its exclusive salon only distribution
policy.222 In order to prove its case, Paul Mitchell sought introduction of
business records of the company which it arranged to sell its products in
China.22 This firm, China Marketing & Distribution (CDM), was a
company that Paul Mitchell found defrauded it by diverting products from
the Chinese market where it would be sold only in salons to other
wholesalers who intended sale to direct retailers.2u Quality King objected to
introduction of the CDM business records on the ground that they were not
authenticated.223
The court found, pursuant to rule 901(b)(4),226 that the document
authentication requirement in this case was satisfied by the document's form
215. Chase Manhattan Bank, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 262.
216. Id. at 253-61.
217. Id.
218. 106 F. Supp. 2d 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
219. Id.
220. lId at 466.
221. Id. at 466-67.
222. Id. at 467.
223. John Paul Mitchell Sys., 106 F. 2d at 468.
224. Id. at 467-69.
225. Id. at471-72.
226. Rule 901(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides, in relevant part: "the
following are examples of authentication or identification conforming with this rule: (4)
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and content, taken together with other circumstances that indicated reliability
of the documents.2 7 Thus authenticated, the court found the documents
admissible pursuant to the residual exception because the records were
particularly trustworthy.tm In its analysis, the court found that the
trustworthiness of the documents was established by the fact that they were
produced by the president of CDM against his interests in the litigation.229
The court also found the issue of whether the Paul Mitchell product was sold
and shipped to Quality King material to the litigation, and the documents
were probative of the fact that CDM believed the product was shipped from
its warehouse in China to Rotterdam.230 The court further found that the
documents were the most probative evidence available of the route the goods
followedY' The court found further still that Quality King had sufficient
notice of the documents, as demonstrated by Quality King's motion in limine
to exclude them.2 32 In the final analysis, the court found that it was in the
best interests of justice to admit the documents.233
Although the documents were admitted pursuant to the residual
exception, Paul Mitchell's motion for preliminary injunction was denied.2
The court found that it did not have the power to issue an injunction on a
replevin claim.235 Again, there appeared to be no abuse by the court of the
residual exception in this case.
The foregoing has been a survey of the federal civil cases found since
the 1997 amendment of rule 807. It does not appear from a review of these
cases that there should be fear that the use of the residual exception is being
abused. In Herzog and Vasquez the courts did not allow statements pursuant
to the exception because they could find no circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness to the statements in question. In Rotolo the statements were
disallowed by the appeals court because adequate notice of the intended use
of the evidence had not been given prior to trial by the plaintiffs. In
Schering, Gonzalez, Chase Manhattan Bank, and John Paul Mitchell
Distinctive Characteristics and the like. Appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or
other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with circumstances."
227. John Paul Mitchell Sys. Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 472.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 473.
230. Id.
231. ki.
232. John Paul Mitchell Sys. Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 473.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 478.
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Systems, both the notice requirements and the requirement of circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness were found to be adequate. However,
admission of such hearsay pursuant to the residual exception seldom
determined the ultimate outcome of the case. Let us now turn to the federal
criminal cases involving the residual exception since the 1997 amendment.
We will see that the analytical framework is just as important as in the civil
cases, if not more so.
B. Criminal Cases
Since the 1997 Amendment, the residual exception has been reported in
few federal criminal cases. No more than eight such cases have been found.
This is approximately equal to the number of civil cases in which the
exception was either mentioned or reported in federal civil cases during the
same time period. Although anecdotal, this provides further evidence that
the residual exception is not being abused by the federal courts as a way of
allowing inadmissible hearsay into evidence. The cases reported on herein
come to us from the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuit Courts
of Appeals.
The introduction of hearsay statements in the context of criminal cases,
whether federal or state, must be assessed in the light of a defendant's right
236to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. The Confrontation Clause
does not operate as an absolute ban on hearsay evidence.237 If the declarant
is unavailable and the statement bears adequate "indicia of reliability,"
hearsay declarations may be received into evidence without violating a
defendant's right to confrontation. 238 The indicia of reliability requirement
can be met in two ways: "where the hearsay statement 'falls within a firmly
rooted hearsay exception,' or where it is supported by 'a showing of
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. 239
In United States v. Sanchez-Lima, 2Q the Ninth Circuit reversed the
conviction of Sanchez-Lima for assault on a federal officer and determined
that evidence he sought to admit at trial under the residual exception should
236. Amendment VI of the United States Constitution provides in relevant part: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses
against him...."
237. See Wright, 497 U.S. at 805, 825.
238. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
239. Wright, 497 U.S. at 816.
240. 161 F.3d 545 (9th Cir. 1998).
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have been admitted.241 In 1996, Sanchez-Lima, an alien, and others illegally
entering the United States from Mexico, were arrested two miles east of the
Otay Mesa port of entry by border Patrol Agents. 24  At the time of his
apprehension, Sanchez-Lima struck an agent with a rock.24 3 Defendant was
arrested for assault on a federal officer in violation of title 18, section 111 of
the United States Code.2" At trial, Sanchez-Lima asserted a self-defense
claim alleging he had been pistol whipped by the federal officer before
striking him.24 5
In all, the Border Patrol agents apprehended twenty-two aliens that
night.24 The Border Patrol and the FBI interviewed and videotaped all of
these aliens the night of their apprehension. 24 7 At trial, Sanchez-Lima
alleged that these interviews contained evidence in support of his self-
defense theory.24 The remaining aliens were deported on May 31, 1996.249
The trial court did not allow admission of the videotaped statements. 250
On appeal, Sanchez-Lima asserted that the failure to admit the
videotaped interviews, pursuant to the residual exception, denied him of his
251 252Sixth Amendment right to present a defense. 1 The Ninth Circuit agreed.
That court reviewed rule 807 and determined that the videotaped statements
contained circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness and met the other
criteria of the rule.253 The government had adequate notice of the intended
use of the evidence.254 The court found the statements were trustworthy
because the declarant's statements: 1) were under oath and subject to the
penalty of perjury; 2) were voluntary; 3) were based on facts within their
own personal knowledge; 4) did not contradict any previous statements to
government agents or defense investigators; and 5) was preserved on
241. Id. at 546.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Title 18, section Il l(a)(1) of the United States Code provides, in relevant part:
"[w]hoever forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes with any
person shall be fined or imprisoned not more than one year."
245. Sanchez-Lima, 161 F.3d at 547.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Sanchez-Lima, 161 F.3d at 547.
251. Id.
252. Id
253. Id. at 547-48.
254. Id. at 548.
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videotape for the jurors to view their demeanor.2 5 5 The court also found that
the government had the opportunity to develop the testimony of these
256witnesses and had notice of the videotapes. The court further found that
the videotaped statements constituted evidence of a material fact regarding
Sanchez-Lima's self-defense theory.5 7 Finally, the court found that "these
statements [were] more probative than any other evidence which could be
procured by reasonable efforts .... 2 8
In refusing to admit the sworn videotaped statements, the district court
effectively prevented Sanchez-Lima from exercising his Sixth Amendment
right to present a defense. The decision appears well reasoned and does not
abuse the hearsay rule.
In United States v. Bryce,25 9 the Second Circuit reviewed Bryce's con-
victions for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and pos-
session with intent to distribute cocaine.20 The convictions grew out of law
enforcement surveillance of persons suspected of narcotics trafficking.
2 61
Agents intercepted and recorded seven telephone conversations between
Bryce and his co-defendant Johnson, and one conversation between Johnson
262and another individual named Gomez.
During the Bryce and Johnson conversations, Bryce arranged to sell
cocaine to Johnson. Johnson, in turn telephoned Gomez and informed him
264that Bryce was selling cocaine. Johnson and Gomez expressed concern
during the conversation that the price quoted would depress the price in
other transactions. 5 Nevertheless, after discussing matters with Gomez,
Johnson called Bryce back and said he would buy two kilograms of
cocaine. Johnson and Bryce agreed to meet in fifteen minutes. 7 The
meeting never took place, because Bryce called Johnson several hours later
to say he had only one left.268 Johnson pleaded with Bryce to sell him the
255. Sanchez-Lima, 161 F.3d at 547.
256. Id. at 548.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. 208 F.3d 346 (2d Cir. 1999).
260. Id. at 348.
261. Id. at 349.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Bryce, 208 F.3d at 349.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
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one kilogram.269 Bryce agreed and they arranged to meet later that day."
This meeting never happened, because Johnson called Bryce five days later
and asked if he still had the cocaine.271 Bryce indicated that he did and they
agreed to meet.272  Several days later Johnson was arrested. Soon
thereafter, Bryce was also arrested.274 No evidence of the cocaine itself was
presented at trial. 5
On appeal, Bryce challenged his conviction on, among other grounds,
that the taped telephone conversation between Johnson and Gomez, in which
Johnson repeated Bryce's claim that he had cocaine for sale and had
276distributed it to others, was inadmissible hearsay. The district court had
admitted the telephone conversation pursuant to the residual exception of
rule 807.
277
The Second Circuit in analyzing the rule and the facts found that Bryce
"[did] not dispute that the statements in the Johnson-Gomez tape were
material, that the declarants were unable to testify, or that the government
complied with the Rule's notice requirement. ' 278 The court found that
Bryce's objection was that the admission of the tape violated his Sixth
Amendment confrontation rights and therefore could not have been deemed
to advance the interests of justice. 9 The court believed that the resolution
of the argument was linked to trustworthiness. 280 The court found that the
Johnson-Gomez tape had a high degree of trustworthiness. 281
The Second Circuit had already held in United States. v. Matthews 2
that:
[O]rdinarily a confession of an accomplice resulting from formal
police interrogation cannot be introduced as evidence of guilt of an
accused, absent some circumstance indicating authorization or
adoption. On the other hand, if the statement is made to a person
269. Bryce, 208 F.3d at 349.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Bryce, 208 F.3d at 349.
275. Id. at 352.
276. Id. at 350.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 351.
279. Bryce, 208 F.3d at 351.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. 20 F.3d 538 (2d Cir. 1994).
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whom the declarant believes is an ally rather than a law
enforcement official, and if the circumstances surrounding the
portion of the statement that inculpates the defendant provide no
reason to suspect that inculpatory portion is any less trustworthy
than the part of the statement that directly incriminates the
declarant, the trustworthiness of the portion that inculpates the
defendant may well be sufficiently established that its admission
does not violate the Confrontation Clause.
283
Under this theory, the court found that the Johnson-Gomez tape did not
violate Bryce's Confrontation rights. The court specifically found:
1) the statements were obtained via a covert wiretap that neither
Johnson nor Gomez was aware; 2) the statements were made
during the same time period that Johnson was conversing with
Bryce; 3) Johnson's statements implicated both himself and Bryce
as participants in a narcotics conspiracy; and 4) Gomez was
Johnson's colleague in the narcotics trade.
Based on these factors, the court found there was little reason to believe that
Johnson and Gomez had any motive to lie, or were lying.285 With this
analysis, the court found the admission of the tape was proper under both
rule 807 and the Confrontation Clause.286 Here, the court rightfully looked
to the surrounding circumstances of Bryce's drug activities to find support
for the appropriate indicia of reliability that made the statement trustworthy.
With such analysis, it is unlikely that the residual exception will swallow the
hearsay rule. Ultimately, the Second Circuit upheld Bryce's conspiracy
conviction, but reversed the possession with intent to distribute cocaine
conviction on the ground that there was no corroborating evidence that
Bryce actually did possess cocaine on the dates specified in the
indictment.287
288In United States v. Papajohn, the Eighth Circuit found that use of the
grand jury testimony of an unavailable witness, admitted pursuant to the
residual exception in an arson and conspiracy trial, was proper.289 Ms.
283. Id. at 545-46.
284. 208 F.3d at 351.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 351.
287. Id. at 356.
288. 212 F.3d 1112 (8th Cir. 2000).
289. Id. at 1119.
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Papajohn and her husband, Donald Lee Earles, were suspected of burning
down their convenience store in order to gain insurance proceeds.29 A
grand jury was convened before which Mr. Earles' son, Donnie, testified
three times.29' During Donnie' s first grand jury appearance, he testified that
he did not know who burned down the store.29 During his second grand
jury appearance, he changed his story, stating that Ms. Papajohn and his
father conspired to burn down the store for the insurance money.293 "During
Donnie's third grand jury appearance, he claimed his Fifth Amendment right
to remain silent and refused to testify."'294
At the subsequent trial of Papajohn and Earles, Donnie again refused to
testify. 295 The trial court declared Donnie an unavailable witness and
allowed the government, over objections of the defense, and pursuant to the
residual exception to the hearsay rule, to read to the jury portions of the
transcripts of all three of Donnie's appearances before the grand jury.2 The
297jury convicted both defendants.
On appeal, Papajohn argued that she should be granted a new trial on
the basis of the Supreme Court's holding in the case of Lilly v. Virginia.29s In
Lilly, the Court held that the admission of a non-testifying accomplice's
confession violated the defendant's right to confront his accuser.
299
However, the Eighth Circuit distinguished the facts of Lilly:
Donnie was never arrested or charged with a crime. The obvious
incentive that the captured accomplice in Lilly had to shift blame is
not present in our case. We recognize that although Donnie was
not charged with a crime at the time he made the statements, he
might still have had some incentive to blame [defendants], so that
he would not later be charged with the arson. It seems to us,
however, that it can almost always be said that a statement made by
a declarant that incriminates another person in a crime will make it
less likely that the declarant will be charged for that crime .... We
290. Id. at 1116.
291. Id
292. Id.
293. Papajohn, 212 F.3d at 1116.
294. Il
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 1116. The appeal in this case was only brought by Ms. Papajohn. She
appealed her convictions for one count of conspiracy to commit arson and mail fraud, one
count of aiding and abetting arson, and two counts of mail fraud. Id. at 1115.
298. 527 U.S. 116 (1999).
299. Id at 119.
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also find that the conditions under which the disputed hearsay
statement was made in our case differ significantly [than] in Lilly.
In Lilly ... the accomplice's statements were made in response to
leading police questions, asked during a custodial interrogation that
took place very late at night, shortly after his arrest.
300
The court in Papajohn found that the grand jury testimony satisfied the
requirement of having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthi-
ness required of rule 807. 301 The court found that Donnie's testimony had
been: 1) given in a formal proceeding; 2) under oath; 3) before a grand
jury.302 Also, Donnie was not in police custody, nor had he been charged
303
with any crime at the time the testimony was given. Further, he had been
asked non leading questions by the government, and he answered them with
lengthy narratives. Papajohn's convictions were affirmed by the Eighth
Circuit.3°5 The Eight Circuit's analysis of the appropriate indicia of reli-
ability factors supporting residual exception as it applied to this situation
does not harm the hearsay rule. It is difficult to argue abuse of the hearsay
rule here.
In United States v. Brothers Construction,306 the Fourth Circuit reached
an opposite result with respect to grand jury testimony that had been
admitted pursuant to the residual exception. Brothers Construction Company
of Ohio and Tri-State Asphalt Corporation were convicted of conspiracy to
defraud the United States, mail fraud, and with making false statements to
the government.307  Their trial and convictions grew out of a scheme
whereby the two companies falsified records in connection with obtaining
highway construction subcontract work in West Virginia.3 °8 Specifically, the
companies obtained federal highway money to comply with the development
of "disadvantaged business enterprises" ("DBEs"). However, no disadvan-
310taged business employees ever performed any of the subcontract work.
300. Papajohn, 212 F.3d at 1119.
301. Id. at 1119.
302. Id. at 1120.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Papajohn, 212 F.3d at 1122.
306. 219 F.3d 300 (4th Cir. 2000).
307. Id. at 308.
308. Id. at 304-06.
309. Id. at 304.
310. Id. at306-08.
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Robert Samol, an officer and in-house counsel for Tri-State, had
testified in the grand jury investigating the case, that prior to sending the
state a letter of certification of the company meeting its DBE goals under its
subcontract, he learned that there had never been an independent DBE work
force.311 At trial, Samol invoked his rights under the Fifth Amendment and
refused to testify.312 The trial court determined that Samol was unavailable,
and "concluded that [his] grand jury testimony was sufficiently reliable."313
The court admitted the grand jury testimony pursuant to the residual
exception.31 4 On appeal, both Brothers and Tri-State asserted that it was
315improper to have allowed the grand jury testimony read to the jury. Here,
the Fourth Circuit agreed.316
The court observed that the nature of grand jury testimony provided
some indicia of trustworthiness, because it was "given in the solemn setting
of the grand jury, under oath and the danger of pejury, in the presence of
jurors who are free to question and assess credibility, and a court reporter
made an official transcript of the proceedings. 317 The court held that with
respect to grand jury testimony they were still "required to consider 'the
totality of the circumstances' [of the testimony] for 'particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness."'
318
In considering the totality of the circumstances in this case, the court
found that Samol's grand jury testimony was suspect. 319 During the oral
argument of the case, the government acknowledged that after Samol's
appearance before the grand jury, the government began an investigation to
determine whether Samol committed perjury through the same testimony3o
that the government sought to introduce. The court held that it had
"serious reservations about the reliability of testimony which, at least in part,
the [g]ovemment finds so untrustworthy that it would consider bringing a
perjury charge. 3 21 As a result, the court concluded that Samol's grand jury
311. Bros. Constr., 219 F.3d at 309.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 309-10.
315. Il
316. Bros. Constr., 219 F.3d at 310.
317. Id.
318. l
319. Id.
320. Id
321. Bros. Const., 219 F.3d at 310.
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testimony was not properly admitted pursuant to the requirements of the
residual exception.
32?
Such reasoning is similar to that used by the district court in Puerto
Rico in the Vasquez case, that found Mr. Lopez's memory problems to be a
weak foundation for the admission of statements pursuant to the residual
323exception. The determination to not admit the grand jury testimony in
Brothers was the correct one and not in conflict with Papajohn when all of
the circumstances are analyzed. Although the court found that the admission
of the grand jury testimony against Brothers was an error, they found it to be
harmless error.32 The Fourth Circuit found that there was other sufficient
evidence to affirm the convictions of both Brothers and Tri-State.325
In United States v. Phillips,326 the Fifth Circuit found that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in refusing to apply the residual exception to
327
admit alleged exculpatory statements of a witness proffered by defendants.
The case involved convictions on several schemes of local corruption
involving ghost employees, payment of salary kickbacks, and misuse of state
government funds by Phillips, the tax assessor for St. Helena Parish,
Louisiana, and Newman, a friend and political supporter who owned the
largest hardware store in the Parish.328
Phillips and Newman were involved in many schemes.329 The Fifth
Circuit found that the salient scheme for purposes of the review of the use of
the residual exception involved Phillips, Newman, and Newman's wife,
330Jean, who was deceased by the time of trial. Starting in 1990, Phillips put
Newman and his wife on the tax assessor payroll, at a salary of $800 per
month, and health benefits. 33 1 The health benefits were important because
Jean had been diagnosed with cancer. Jean subsequently died of cancer in
3321992. She remained on the tax assessor payroll until one month prior to
322. Id.
323. See Vasquez, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 197.
324. Id. at 320.
325. Id. at 320-21.
326. 219 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2000).
327. Id. at 419.
328. Id. The defendants were each convicted on all counts of a twenty-nine count
indictment charging conspiracy, mail fraud, engaging in an illegal monetary transaction, theft
from a federally funded program, money laundering, and perjury. Id. at 407.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 408, 419.
331. Id. at407-08.
332. Phillips, 219 F.3d at 407.
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her death.333 Facts at trial showed that over the time period of this scheme
Newman kicked back most of their $800 a month salary to Phillips, less what
was needed to pay federal taxes at the end of the year.3 4 Evidence at trial
showed that Newman and his wife did little or no work for the tax
assessor.
335
At trial, defendants sought to admit exculpatory statements made by
Jean Newman to her friend Margaret Carter to show that she was working
for the assessors office.336 The trial court would not admit the statements
under the residual exception.337 If she had been allowed to testify,
defendants maintained
that Carter would have testified that one day, while in the hardware
store, she noticed Jean working with several pieces of paper.
When Carter inquired about the nature of the paperwork, Jean
allegedly responded that she was working on a project for Phillips
that had something to do with land.
338
The Fifth Circuit, in a footnote, enumerated the requirements of rule
807, and then held:
The passing comment made by Jean concerning her employment is
arguably vague. It may be correct that Jean would have no reason
to lie in making a passing comment to a casual acquaintance
concerning the nature of any paperwork she was doing. It may also
be correct, however, that Jean's motivation to lie-her desire to
maintain the favorable status of her pseudo-employment for the
purpose of receiving health coverage-was so strong that any
statements made concerning her supposed employment with the
assessor's office cannot be trusted.
33 9-
The court found that "[riegardless of which option seemed more
persuasive, neither presents a 'definite and firm conviction the [district]
court made a clear error of judgment"' by excluding the statements.3 '4 As
such, the court did not disturb the ruling of the trial court with respect to the
333. Id. at 408.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 419.
337. Phillips, 219 F.3d at 419.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Ud
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hearsay exclusion. 341 Again, good analysis by the court of the circumstances
and motivations for the proffered statement found that there was inadequate
indicia of reliability to support the trustworthiness of the statement.
Can one find abuse of the residual exception with respect to any of
these federal criminal cases? Of course not. The federal courts have used
good analysis and common sense in assessing the equivalent guarantees of
trustworthiness required of evidence admitted under rule 807. In Sanchez-
Lima, Bryce, and Papajohn, the court found equivalent guarantees of
trustworthiness for the statements after thoroughgoing analysis. In Brothers
and Phillips, analysis by the courts showed that the admission of the
statements sought to be admitted were unreliable and not supported by
equivalent guarantees of trustworthiness. Although the standard used to
reach the decision to admit the evidence pursuant to the residual exception
was different, it appears that such decisions were solid and reasonable in
each case,
Let us now turn our attention to the various states who, since 1997,
have reported cases that involved the residual exception. Could it be that
state courts are abusing the hearsay rule by its overindulgent use of the
residual exception? The evidence from the cases says no.
V. THE RESIDUAL EXCEPTION IN STATE COURT CASES
A. Civil Cases
Our search of the reported use of the residual exception in state cases
since 1997, yielded only a small number of such reports in civil cases. Such
cases were reported from Colorado, 42 Delaware, and Arkansas. A
341. Id.
342. Rule 804(b)(5) of the Colorado Rules of Evidence provides:
A statement not specifically covered by [Rule 803 or 804] but having equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is not excluded by the hearsay rule, if the
court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence
which proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes
of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the
statement into evidence.
COLO. R. EvIn. 804(b)(5). On January 1, 1999, Colorado transferred its two part residual
exceptions into one new rule 807 Residual Exception.
343. Rule 803(24) of the Deleware Rules of Evidence provides: the following is not
excluded by DEL. R. EviD. 803(24) 802, the hearsay rule:
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review of these cases shows that fears of the residual exception in state court
cases swallowing the hearsay rule as we know it is highly unlikely. The
judges in the state courts appear to be very careful with respect to the
admission of hearsay pursuant to the residual exception. These judges use
the same analytical framework of seeking to determine whether there are
appropriate indicia of reliability to give the statements trustworthiness.
These same judges seek to determine whether there has been proper notice
of intent to use the exception.
In the Colorado case, Board of County Commissioners v. City and
County of Denver,345 the court of appeals upheld the introduction by
plaintiffs, pursuant to the residual exception to the hearsay rule, of a study
prepared for defendant.346 The case involved a breach of contract action
brought by the county concerning excessive noise levels by the defendant,
City of Denver's airport.347 The study, prepared for Denver, showed that a
sixth runway would increase noise levels. 347 The court found the report was
probative of the validity of Denver's defenses and that it was not inherently
A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that:
(A) the statement is offered as a evidence of a material fact;
(B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other
evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and
(C) the general purposes of these rules and the interest of justice will best be served by
admission of the statement into evidence.
DEL. R. Evm. 803(24).
344. Rule 803(24) of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence provides:
Other Exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing
exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the
court determines that (i) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (ii) the
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence
which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (iii) the general
purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of
the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this
exception unless the proponent makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in
advance to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his
intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and
address of the declarant.
A K. R. EvID. 803(24).
345. Board of County Comm'rs v. City & County of Denver, No. 00CA0217, 2001
Colo. App. LEXIS 564, *1 (Colo. Ct. App. Mar. 29,2001).
346. Id. at *1.
347. ld.
348. Id. at *25.
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unreliable. 349 Plaintiff county ultimately prevailed and received damages for
350the excessive noise.
The admission of hearsay statements were also admitted pursuant to the
residual exception in a Delaware case. In Juran v. Bron, 35 the Delaware
Court of Chancery reviewed the trial of parties involved in a partnership
venture.352 Plaintiffs alleged fraud and breach of fiduciary duty against
defendants.353 The trial court had admitted into evidence a conversation of
the son of one of the defendants that went to the heart of the plaintiff's fraud,
bad faith, and fiduciary duty claims.354 The Appeals Court upheld this
ruling, finding that the statements had circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness. The court found that, "in an action for fraud and breach of
fiduciary duty where few nonparties have knowledge of the facts, statements
by a witness in a position to know the truth should.., be admitted. 355
Lincoln v. AAA Bail Bond Co. 356 was an Arkansas case where the
introduction of evidence pursuant to the residual exception was found to be
reversible error.357 In Lincoln, appellant Lincoln brought suit "to collect
unpaid commissions he claimed to have earned prior to his termination.
358
A judgment, however, was entered in favor of the appellee bail bond
company.359 The court of appeals reviewed the admission of an exhibit
relied upon by appellee to show that Lincoln owed the company money. The
exhibit was a list concerning accounts receivable, which allegedly reflected
360monies collected by Lincoln, but not turned in to the company.
The court of appeals found the introduction of this evidence was
inadmissible under the residual exception. 361 They held that the list had not
been prepared in the regular course of business, but was prepared for a
special purpose to show the court that Lincoln owed the company money.
362
The court also found that the source of the information contained in the
349. Id. at *26.
350. Id. at *29.
351. No. 16464, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 232, at *1.
352. Id. at *1.
353. Id.
354. Id. at *10-11.
355. Id. at *12.
356. No. CA 98-365, 1998 Ark. App. LEXIS 863, at *1 (Ark. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 1998).
357. Id. at *1.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Id. at *3.
361. Lincoln, 1998 Ark. App. LEXIS 863, at *6.
362. Id.
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exhibit lacked trustworthiness, since the. information was provided by
criminal defendants who had the incentive to inflate the amount of monies
363paid, so as to reduce their own debts.
Each of these state courts was cognizant and discerning of the
requirement that there be circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness before
evidence could be admitted under the residual exception. Although these
state cases are far less analytical than those reported from the federal courts,
they all articulate, in a well reasoned way, the reason the hearsay statements
were admissible or inadmissible. Again, in these states there should be no
worry that the residual exception will swallow the hearsay rule. It is clear
the state court judges in the civil cases reported on here have not abused
their power with respect to the residual exception.
B. Criminal Cases
Let us now briefly examine the state criminal law cases reported since
1997 involving the residual exception. The state courts must often balance
the residual exception against a defendant's confrontation rights. A review
of the state criminal cases shows that such state courts are very careful
concerning admission of hearsay pursuant to the residual exception. In
Arkansas, the Court of Appeals of the state has upheld trial judges' refusal
that a defendant be allowed to admit hearsay pursuant to that state's residual
exception on several occasions. In Clark v. State,3 a the defendant, on trial
for murder, sought to introduce statements through a police detective who
had allegedly heard that other persons had bragged to confidential police
informants that they, and not the defendant, had committed the murder.365
The trial court and the court of appeals found no guarantees of
trustworthiness to such alleged statements and excluded the evidence.366
367In Bilyeu v. State, the Arkansas court of appeals again upheld the trial
court's refusal to admit statements pursuant to residual exception.36' Bilyeu,
on trial for the death of his girlfriend's nineteen-month-old son, sought to
introduce a diary, purportedly written by the girlfriend, to show that he could
363. Id.
364. No. CACR 98-86, 1998 Ark. App. LEXIS 747, at *1 (Ark. App. Ct. Oct. 14,
1998).
365. Id. at *1.
366. Id. at *12.
367. No. CACR 97-505, 1998 Ark. App. LEXIS 66, at *1 (Ark. Ct. App. Feb. 4,
1998).
368. Id. at *5.
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not have killed the child on the day in question.369 The court found that
since the diary was unsigned and undated, that it did not contain equivalent
guarantees of trustworthiness required by the state's residual exception.370
In Williams v. State,37 1 defendant's attempt to introduce hearsay through
the residual exception also failed.372 In this murder and kidnapping case,
Williams gave a statement concerning his involvement in the crimes at the
time of his arrest.373 He later made a different and less inculpatory statement
374to county detectives prior to trial. At trial the State introduced, in its case
in chief, only Williams' first statement. 375 Williams sought to introduce his
second statement. The court ruled that it was inadmissible under the residual
exception because there was no guarantee of trustworthiness to this second
statement, which Williams made after a co-defendant had implicated him.
376
The court contended that Williams had every reason to give detectives a self-
377serving statement to minimize his participation in the crimes.
The Arkansas cases show that there is little likelihood that the residual
exception will swallow the hearsay rule, or that judges are abusing the use of
the exception. In Clark, Bilyeu, and Williams, none of the defendants could
show the requisite indicia of reliability surrounding the statements they
proffered to make one believe that they were trustworthy.
378In People v. Meyer, the court of appeals of Colorado upheld the
prosecution's right to introduce, pursuant to the residual exception, a veri-
fied complaint to obtain a restraining order sworn out by the murder victim
against defendant.379 The court found that the complaint possessed sufficient
indicia of reliability as a court document, and that the victim had little reason
to fabricate.380 Because the statement possessed the necessary guarantees of
trustworthiness, admission of the statement did not violate defendant's right
381
of confrontation.
369. Id. at *4.
370. Id. at *5.
371. 946 S.W.2d 678 (Ark. 1997).
372. Id. at 680.
373. Id. at 684.
374. Id.
375. Id. at 683.
376. Williams, 946 S.W.2d at 684.
377. Id.
378. 952 P. 2d 774 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997).
379. Id. at 777.
380. Id.
381. Id.
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382In State v. Anderson, the court did not allow the prosecution to
introduce, pursuant to Delaware's residual exception, statements made by
the victim in a felony murder case while he was in the hospital. The victim
gave three statements concerning the identity of the defendants before he
died.38 3 The court found that over the course of the victim's hospitalization
he suffered from nightmares and hallucinations.384 The court also found that
over the course of the hospitalization the victim discussed the case with
numerous people.385 The court maintained that such facts raised doubts as to
whether the proffered statements against defendants came from the victim's
386
unaided memory. Lacking particularized guarantees of trustworthiness,
the court excluded the statements because to admit them would have
deprived defendants of their right to confrontation.
387
388In an earlier case, State v. Bowe, the court reached a similar finding
with respect to the in hospital photo identifications of defendants by the
victim nine days after an assault. The court found that the photo
identifications, sought to be introduced by the prosecution came after the
victim had spoken with the detective investigating the case nine times.389 The
court was not convinced that the identification was not influenced by the
detective or by something other than a desire to tell the truth. 390 There was
no appropriate indicia of reliability to the identifications to be found in this
situation. The identifications were disallowed pursuant to the residual
exception.
In State v. Castaneda,3 91 the Supreme Court of Iowa overturned the
defendant's conviction for child abuse and remanded the case. The court
provided an explanation supporting the use of the residual exception on
remand. Yet, the court gave no thoroughgoing analysis for the trial court to
follow in order to determine whether there existed particularized "guarantees
of trustworthiness" with respect to the reintroduction at the retrial of a
videotaped statement of the child victim. 392 Castaneda is disappointing in
this respect.
382. 2000 Del. Super. LEXIS 60 (Mar. 20, 2000).
383. Id. at 1.
384. Id. at 12.
385. id.
386. Id.
387. 2000 Del. Super. LEXIS 60 at 12.
388. 1997 Del. Super. LEXIS 603 (1997).
389. Id. at 4.
390. Id. at 9.
391. 621 N.W.2d 435 (Iowa 2001).
392. Id. at 443-48.
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The same court gave an excellent analysis of its findings of
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness in the case of State v. Halum.393
In Hallum, the court allowed the prosecution during a murder trial, pursuant
to the residual exception, to introduce defendant's accomplice's videotaped
narrative of the crime.394
The accomplice in Hallum was Carlos Medina. The Supreme Court of
Iowa allowed Medina's statement into evidence pursuant to the residual
exception after finding: 1) Medina was not offered leniency in exchange for
his statement; 2) he did not attempt to shift blame to the defendant; 3) he
unequivocally acknowledged that he committed serious offenses and did not
attempt to avoid responsibility for his own acts; 4) he did not attempt to
curry favor with the police; 5) he voluntarily gave his statement after being
given his Miranda rights; 6) he had not been caught "red-handed" and so was
not in a situation where his only recourse was to share blame by implicating
the defendant; 7) his statement was given shortly after the commission of the
crime while his memory was fresh; and 8) his statement was extremely
detailed.395 This thoroughgoing analysis by the court demonstrated that there
were appropriate indicia of reliability to show that the statement was
trustworthy.
In State v. Martin,396 the Supreme Court of Minnesota upheld the trial
court's refusal to allow the defendant, who was on trial for murder, to
introduce a double hearsay statement as part of his defense. 397 The court
found that the defendant had failed to establish sufficient guarantees of
trustworthiness because he made no offer of proof about the circumstances
of the conversations about the declarant's memory.398 Additionally, the
court found that before defendant had offered this double hearsay testimony,
he had already introduced extrinsic evidence to contradict the proffered
testimony.
399
A year earlier in State v. Martin,4°° involving the same defendant, the
Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed the state appellate court's ruling that
prior testimony of Martin's co-defendants who were tried separately could
393. 585 N.W.2d 249 (Iowa 1999).
394. Id. at 257-59.
395. Id. at 257.
396. 614 N.W.2d 214 (Minn. 2000).
397. Id. at 225.
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. 591 N.W.2d 481 (Minn. 1999).
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be introduced at his trial by the prosecution.401 The supreme court found that
the appeals court erred when it concluded that the entire portions of the co-
defendants' trial testimony bore sufficient indicia of reliability to merit
admission under the residual exception and the Confrontation Clause.40 2 The
supreme court found that some of the proffered testimony was so unreliable
it would have to be subjected to cross examination.
In re L.E.P.,40 3 a case involving a juvenile, the Supreme Court of
Minnesota examined the criteria state courts should articulate in evaluating
statements by young children admitted pursuant to the residual exception.4
The criteria included evaluating the "lack of motive to fabricate, spontaneity
and demeanor of the child, expressions unexpected from a child of that age,
and the absence of leading questions.
In State v. Wikan, the Court of Appeal of Minnesota upheld the
prosecution's introduction of prior inconsistent statements of a victim of
spousal abuse pursuant to the state's residual exception.4 0 7 The court found
that the prior statements implicating her spouse, which differed from her
testimony at trial, possessed the requisite guarantees of trustworthiness.40
The court found that the statements were reliable, because: 1) they were
against interest due to the relationship; 2) she did not appear confused when
she made the statements; 3) the statements were corroborative of what other
witnesses testified, and 4) they were made just after the event.49
In People v. Lee,410 the court of appeal of that state upheld the
admission, pursuant to the state's residual exception, statements of a victim
of an armed robbery who died before the trial. The declarant identified
defendant as the perpetrator. The court found the statements had particul-
arized guarantees of trustworthiness. 411 Among other factors, the court
found were that 1) the victim suffered no memory loss from the incident; 2)
401. Id. at 484.
402. Id.
403. 594 N.W.2d 163 (Minn. 1999).
404. Id. at 170-71.
405. Id. at 173.
406. No. C1-96-880, 1997 Minn. App. LEXIS 271, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 11,
1997) (unpublished opinion).
407. Id.at*ll.
408. Id at *6.
409. Id. at *6-7.
410. 622 N.W.2d 71 (2000).
411. Id. at79.
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that he was coherent when he made the statements; 3) he was not confused;
412
and 4) the statements were voluntary.
In People v. Welch,413 the Michigan Court of Appeals upheld the trial
court's decision not to allow a hearsay statement offered by the defendant
414pursuant to the residual exception. Defendant, on trial for the murder of a
girlfriend he allegedly pushed off a bridge to her death, sought the
introduction of statements by witnesses who allegedly heard the victim say
she was going to kill herself moments before her plunge.415 Here, the court
held that the statements were not reliable. The court found that statement
had not been related directly to the police officer who would testify. The
defense sought to have the police officer testify to what a witness had
416
overheard from others. However, there was 1) no evidence that this
witness actually heard the statement by the victim; 2) no other witnesses
testified as to such statement; 3) sixteen minutes had elapsed between the
victim's plunge and the witness relating the information to the officer.417 The
court also found unreliable the fact that the officer who approached the
group of witnesses 4) found them laughing and giggling about the
situation. Finally, the court found the officer 5) had not written down the
statement.41 9 A sad set of facts here would not support a finding of
equivalent guarantees of trustworthiness.
In State v. Gamer,420 the Supreme Court of Nebraska upheld the trial
court's refusal to introduce tapes of a false confession at a murder trial. 42'
Defendant, on trial for murder sought introduction of the taped confession of
an eleven-year-old boy who confessed to the crime. 422 The eleven-year-old
had been seen at the victim's house prior to the murder.423 He was
questioned by police for seven hours before defendant became the true
suspect of the crime. The eleven year old later said he made up the
confession so that he could go home and go to sleep.424 The eleven year old
412. Id. at 80-81.
413. 574 N.W.2d 682 (Minn. Ct. App. 1977).
414. Id. at 685.
415. Id. at 684.
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. Welch, 574 N.W. at 684.
419. Id.
420. 614 N.W. 2d 319 (Neb. 2000).
421. Id. at 329-30.
422. Id. at 323.
423. Id. at 323.
424. Id. at 323.
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was available and testified at trial.4 5 The court found the tapes were
inadmissable hearsay and that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial
court to not allow the tapes pursuant to the residual exceptionY2 There was
no guarantee of trustworthiness to the tapes made under the conditions of
this case. The court rightly decided in this situation that it was best that the
eleven-year-old, who was available for the trial, testify and be subjected to
cross examination.
In State v. Jacob,4 27 the Supreme Court of Nebraska again upheld a trial
court's refusal to allow a defendant, on trial for murder, to introduce
evidence pursuant to the residual exception.428 In this case, Jacob sought
introduction of a videotape deposition of a used car salesman in Maine.429
Jacob, who had planned to fly to England, sought to sell his vehicle in
Maine, where he had driven after killing his girlfriend and her new lover in
Nebraska. 30 He sought introduction of the videotape to show his innocent
behavior prior to his arrest.43' The Nebraska trial court did no analysis, but
held that the videotape would not be admitted pursuant to the residual
432
exception. The Supreme Court found the trial court had not abused its
discretion for the "residual hearsay exception is to be used rarely and only in
exceptional circumstances. ' 433 The opinion infers that the defense did little
to show that the proffered videotape possessed any particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness. The court was correct not to admit the evidence.
As this review illustrates, the state courts are very cautious concerning
introduction of hearsay pursuant to the residual exception in criminal cases.
The Supreme Court of Arkansas, in three separate cases, would not allow
introduction of defense evidence pursuant to the residual exception. In
Delaware, the court, in separate cases, twice denied prosecutors the use of
residual hearsay of unreliable identifications by crime victims who were
hospitalized. The Supreme Court of Iowa gave a very thoroughgoing
analysis of appropriate indicia of reliability for introduction of the
statements in Hallum. In the four cases considered by the Supreme Court of
Minnesota, the court found particularized guarantees of trustworthiness in
425. Gamer, 614 N.W.2d at 330.
426. Id.
427. 574 N.W.2d 117 (Neb. 1998).
428. Id. at 139.
429. Id.
430. Id at 126-28.
431. Id. at 139.
432. Id. at 139-40.
433. d at 139.
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only two of the cases. The Michigan courts allowed testimony pursuant to
the residual exception in one case, but not the second. The Nebraska court
gave short shrift to defendants' requests to introduce hearsay pursuant to the
residual exception in the two cases it considered. As a result of this review,
we need not fear that the use of the residual exception is being abused by
judges in state criminal court cases.
C. The Florida Cases
As noted earlier in this article, Florida does not have a residual
exception akin to rule 807. However, Florida does have two sections of its
evidence code directed to the types of circumstances where residual
exceptions often are applied. Section 90.803(23) allows the use of out-of-
court statements of children eleven years old or younger in child abuse cases.
Section 90.803(24) allows introduction of such statements by elderly or
disabled adults. These may be viewed as "quasi-residual" exceptions.
This survey would not be complete without commenting on the cases in
Florida where hearsay statements have been offered pursuant to these
"quasi-residual" exceptions. The initial question is whether such cases
require the same type of rule 807 analysis to determine whether there are
appropriate indicia of reliability and notice to establish trustworthiness. The
answer is, of course, no. There is no need for an independent analytical
framework in Florida because the statutes in question set out the
requirements to be followed. If the requirements of the statute are not met,
the evidence is not allowed. A review of the cases reveals that the courts of
Florida are very careful with the hearsay evidence sought to be introduced
pursuant to their "quasi-residual" statutes.
The essence of both statutes is that they seek to test the reliability of out
of court statements. In criminal cases, notice must be given. In all cases the
judge must hold a hearing outside of the hearing of the jury to determine the
reliability of such statements.434 If reliable, such statements may be intro-
duced whether the declarant is available or unavailable.435 If the declarant is
unavailable:
the trial judge must determine whether the hearsay statement is
reliable and from a trustworthy source without regard to
corroborating evidence. If the answer is yes, then the judge must
determine whether other corroborating evidence is present. If the
434. See FLA. R. EVrD. 90.903(23)(a)(1), 90.803(24)(a)(1).
435. See FLA. R. EviD. 90.903(23)(a)(2), 90.803(24)(a)(2).
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answer to either question is no, then the hearsay statements are
inadmissable. 436
In Doe v. Broward County School Board,437 a trainable mentally
retarded girl with Down's Syndrome had been digitally penetrated by a
mentally disabled male in an after school care program at an elementary
school in Broward County. 38 Her mother brought a personal injury lawsuit
claiming negligent supervision.439 The victim was unavailable to testify at
the trial. The School Board made a motion in limine to exclude from trial the
victim's hearsay statements to her mother and a psychologist on the ground
that the hearsay statements were not admissible pursuant to section
90.803(23), because the victim was unavailable and there was no
corroborating evidence of the incident. 44° The trial court granted the motion
in limine. 4" The court then granted the School Board's motion for summary
judgment "based upon the court's conclusion that section 90.803(23)
preempted all other hearsay exceptions, and as a result, [the victim] had no
evidence with which to prove her case.
'
"
2
The Florida District Court of Appeal found that the trial judge had not
abused its discretion in finding that there was no corroborating evidence of
the incident which would allow the introduction of the hearsay statements
pursuant to section 90.803(23).443 The appeals court reversed the summary
judgment and remanded the case for the trial judge to determine whether the
victim's out of court statements may have been admitted pursuant to other
hearsay exceptions.
"
In Florida v. Townsend,i " 5 the Supreme Court of Florida reversed
defendant's conviction for abuse of a child of a two year old because of
436. Ud
437. 744 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
438. Id. at 1070.
439. Id.
440. Id.
441. Id.
442. Doe, 744 So. 2d at 1070.
443. Id. at 1071.
444. Id. at 1073. Specifically, the court remanded the case in order that the trial court
might determine whether the victim's out-of-court statements to the psychologist, not relating
to the identity of the perpetrator, were admissible under the medical diagnosis and treatment
exception and whether the victim's out of court statements to her mother were admissible as
excited utterances. Id.
445. 635 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 1994).
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errors in the trial court's failure to make adequate findings for the admission
446
of the child victim's hearsay statement. The court found that:
Section 90.803 (23) (a) (1) mandates that the trial judge, in a
hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury, determine
whether a hearsay statement is trustworthy and reliable by
examining the 'time, content, and circumstances' of the statement,
the court may consider the mental and physical age and maturity of
the child, the nature and duration of the abuse or offense, the
relationship of the child to the offender, the reliability of the
assertion, the reliability of the child victim and any other factor
deemed appropriate .... Other factors may include.., a consid-
eration of the statements's spontaneity; whether the statement was
made at the first available opportunity following the alleged
incident.., whether the child used terminology unexpected of a
child of similar age; the motive or lack thereof to fabricate the
statement... [I]n sum, as noted by the United States Supreme
Court in Wright, a court is to use a totality of the circumstances
evaluation in determining reliability.
447
The court in Townsend found, however, that "the trial judge merely
listed each of the statements to be considered and summarily concluded,
without explanation or factual findings, that the time, content, and
circumstances of the statements to be admitted at trial were sufficient to
reflect that the statements were reliable."" 8 The court found such findings
insufficient under both the Florida statute and the constitutional
requirements of Idaho v. Wright.449
Similarly, in Hill v. State,450 the district court of appeal reversed and
remanded defendant's conviction for sexual battery and a lewd and
lascivious act committed in the presence of a four year old.45' The court
found that, although some of the child's out-of-court hearsay statements had
been found reliable pursuant to section 90.803(23), the trial court had erred
when it allowed the examining physician to testify as to the child victim's
446. Id. at 958.
447. id. at 957-58.
448. Id. at. 958.
449. Id.
450. 643 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
451. Id. at 654.
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statements about the defendant's culpability, without observing the
safeguards of section 90.803(23) with respect to such testimony. 452
In State v. Jones,5 3 the Supreme Court of Florida determined that by
providing safeguards outlined in section 90.803(23), the legislature of
Florida had sought to strike a balance between the need to consider child
hearsay statements in judicial proceedings and the rights of the accused 4
The court held that section 90.803(23) comported "with the confrontation
clauses of both the federal Constitution and the Florida Constitution."
455
In stark contrast to these child abuse cases, the Supreme Court of
Florida in Conner v. State,456 held that the use of hearsay exception for
elderly adults, pursuant to section 90.803(24), was, in criminal cases
unconstitutional. In that case, the defendant was convicted, on a plea of
nolo contendre, of armed burglary, armed robbery and armed kidnapping.4
The victim was an eighty year old man who died prior to trial,459 The trial
court ruled that hearsay statements he gave to police about the crime were
corroborated by other evidence, and that the state would be allowed in a
hearing "to establish that the circumstances surrounding the statements
guaranteed their reliability.
' 4 °
The Supreme Court of Florida found deficiencies in the statute as it
applied to elderly persons. The court found that section 90.803(24), in
defining elderly as an adult sixty years of age or older, applies to a much
broader class of adult declarants than did the child abuse statute of section
90.803(23). 6" As written, the statute applied to all persons over sixty years
old. The court also found, unlike the child abuse statute which was limited
to acts describing child abuse, neglect, or sexual abuse, that under the
90.804(24) exception for the elderly, declarants could describe "any act of
abuse or neglect, any act of exploitation, the offense of battery or aggravated
battery or assault or aggravated assault or sexual battery, or any other violent
act."4 2 Thus, the elderly hearsay exception would not be limited to crimes
concerning elder abuse. Finally, the court could not determine a list of
452. Id.
453. 625 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 1993).
454. Id. at 826.
455. Id.
456. 748 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 2000).
457. Id. at 954.
458. Id. at 953.
459. Id. at 952.
460. Id at 953.
461. Conner, 748 So. 2d at 958.
462. Id (quoting FLA. STAT. § 90.803(24)(a)).
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factors for the elderly, unlike the factors for children set out in section
90.803(23), that would guarantee the reliability of the hearsay statements of
the elderly adult.
463
The case was well reasoned. From such reasoning, it is easy to presume
that though Florida has no residual rule akin to 807, the "quasi-residual"
exceptions it has adopted for the elderly and children will not swallow the
hearsay rule as we know it.
VI. CONCLUSION
This review of the twelve federal cases and twenty-two state cases,
which relied on the residual exception in some part, show that there has been
no abuse of the rule by the courts at the federal or the state level since the
1997 amendment to the residual exception. Courts appear vigilant with
respect to analyzing the need for particularized guarantees of trustworthiness
for statements proffered pursuant to the exception. Very often, such analysis
shows that the statements lack the particularized guarantees of trustworthi-
ness needed to pass muster. We need the residual exception to the hearsay
rule. It is the exception that gives flexibility to the rule. If the states are
reluctant to adopt such residual exceptions, they may well be advised to look
at the Florida model, especially for child abuse and neglect cases.
463. Id. at 958-59.
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